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Abstract
This paper discusses the emergence of a new model of welfare and social assistance in Central
and  Eastern  Europe.  It  starts  by  briefly  summarizing  the  most  recent  social  policy
developments occurring in Bulgaria,  Czech Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary, Latvia,  Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia and continues investigating the most urgent reform challenges
and adaptational strategies. As argued elsewhere (see Cerami 2006a), the main argument of
the  paper  is  that  CEECs  are  moving towards  a  new world  of  welfare  capitalism,  which
combines  old with new social  policy characteristics.  A special  emphasis  in  this  paper  is,
however, given to the systems of social assistance, since these represent the last public policy
instrument  to  prevent  citizens  to  fall  into  extreme  poverty.  As  it  will  be  argued,  social
assistance schemes did not only play a crucial role in the process of democratic transition
cushioning  the  negative  effects  of  the  economic  transformation,  but  they  also  represent
important sources of democratic engineering providing legitimacy to the newly established
market-oriented order. A substantial  reconsideration in the social policy logic behind their
establishment is, however, urgently required.
Keywords: Central  and Eastern Europe, comparative social  policy, welfare states, welfare
reforms, transition economies, social assistance regimes.  
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Introduction1
On 1st May 2004 and on 1st January 2007, Europe enlarged its borders to the East, increased
the  number  of  its  citizens  (other  countries  will  probably join  soon),  but  also  added  new
challenges for national welfare systems as well as for EU institutions. European Integration,
harmonization and convergence of national social policies have now become crucial topics in
conferences and international meetings, but the mechanisms of adaptation, by which national
welfare systems may adjust to internal and external pressures, remain partly unknown. This
paper focuses on Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and, in particular, it looks
at the social policy developments occurring in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,  Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. A special emphasis here is given
to the systems of social assistance, since these represent the last public policy instrument to
prevent citizens to fall into extreme poverty. As it will be argued in the course of the paper,
social  assistance  schemes  did  not  only  play  a  crucial  role  in  the  process  of  democratic
transition  cushioning  the  negative  effects  of  the  economic  transformation,  but  they  also
represent  important  sources  of  democratic  engineering  providing  legitimacy to  the  newly
established market-oriented order.
The paper is structured as follows: Part one briefly summarizes the system of social protection
existing during communism, but also the most recent social policy developments in pension,
health care, protection against unemployment and family policies. Part two focuses on social
assistance schemes,  but  also  on the reform challenges  that  Central  and Eastern European
policy makers are confronted with. In the third and final section, the adaptational strategies of
national  welfare  systems are  explored.  A  brief  reference  here  is  given  to  the  process  of
recalibration of  old  structures,  to  the  recombinant  transformation taking  place  in  these
systems of social security, drawing attention, in the conclusions, to the need for substantial
reforms of the main logic driving social assistance provisions.
1 Some parts of this paper have been presented at the 3rd ESPAnet annual conference “Making Social Policy in
the Postindustrial  Age”, September  22-24,  2005,  University of  Fribourg,  Switzerland and at  the  conference
“Transformation  of  Social  Policy in  Europe:  Patterns,  Issues and  Challenges  for  the  EU-25 and  Candidate
Countries”, Department of Political Science and Public Administration  METU, Ankara, Turkey, April 13-15,
2006.  The author would like to thank all  the participants at  the conferences  for their helpful comments and
critiques. It goes without saying that whatever faults remain in this revised and updated version are entirely my
own responsibility.   
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Social Policy before 1989
During communism, social policy was an integral part of the central planned economy. This
was an extremely centralized system of resource production and allocation called to regulate
all  spheres  of  social  life.  Central  planning  included  dealing  with  industrial  and  labour
relations, the setting of wages and of prices, the production and the distribution of goods and
of services, the allocation of various social  policy resources (such as housing and welfare
benefits) and, last but not least, the regulation of the individuals’ time through the division of
labour, but also through the involvement in sport and other activities strongly anchored in the
communist ideology.    
Pensions  were  based  on  the  occupational  status  and  financed by contributions,  but  since
officially  all  citizens  were  in  employment  and  wage differences  were  extremely limited,
benefits tended to be universal in coverage and flate-rate in scope. This clearly coincided with
the communist  ideology of standardization of income and life standards.  Pensions  ranged
between 50 and 100 per cent of a base calculated on the average of the best five within the
final ten years of work. Retirement age, as well as the level of benefits, was low (60 years for
men  and  55  years  for  women  with  approximately  25  years  of  service)  (Connor  1997).
Exceptions, however, existed. For example, special privileges were often granted to particular
professional groups in strategic sector of the state apparatus (such as miners or police forces).
The communist nomenclature also ensured its members had the access to better services, even
though not officially (King and Szelényi 2004).
The Semashko-model was the basis of the communist health care sector. This was a highly
centralized  system of  health  care  planning,  with  decisions  concerning  the  regulation  and
implementation  of  services  taken  at  the  national  level  with  limited  or  extremely  low
knowledge of local real needs. All citizens had a constitutional right to health care services,
but these were underdeveloped if compared to Western standards. The poor quality of services
resulted not only in high morbidity and mortality rates (Deacon 2000), but also in increasing
dissatisfaction among the population. Services, however, were only formally granted free of
charge.  The  existence  of  “gratitude  money”  given  to  doctors  soon  became  the  norm,
contributing in altering the nature and the universal aspirations of the communist health care
system. The emergence of this atypical form of “additional payment” can be explained from
two perspectives. On the side of the medical personnel, it  is explained by the necessity to
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increase  the  low wages they received.  On the side of the  patients,  by contrast,  it  can be
explained by the will (and necessity) of choosing their own doctor on the basis of personal
trust and not only on the basis of the residence as the system required (such as in Hungary).
This also involved obtaining better, individualized and, therefore, not standardized treatments.
Unemployment  was  practically  non-existent.  The  system  officially  worked  on  full
employment, but some form of hidden unemployment did exist.  Since the central planned
economy regulated the functioning of the labour market, it was not rare that for tasks, which
in Western Europe were accomplished by one worker, two workers were employed in the
communist system. There were also other serious problems linked to central planning, but,
more  in  general,  associated  to  the  excessive  standardization  of  life  promoted  by  the
communist ideology. The excessive standardization of wages produced the undesired effect of
reducing work performance  (see Cerami 2006a).  Workers  had in fact  no good reason for
working  beyond  minimum  requirements,  with  the  exclusion  of  medals  granted  by  party
officials as a symbol of loyalty to the state. The fact that most of welfare benefits were linked
and granted through the enterprise in which the workers belonged to (Ferge 1979) created
circles of loyalty around party officials, which did not necessarily represent work incentives
that may have led to an increase in work performance.
If during the first years of communism (the years immediately after the end of World War II),
the family was seen as a reactionary force and cause of all  diseases of modern societies,
communist  leaders  soon realized that  the family could  also  play an important  role in  the
stabilization of the political system recently introduced (Ferge 1978; Sokolowska 1978). As a
consequence,  political  leaders  gave  their  consensus  on  the  establishment  of  an  extensive
system of family benefits,  made not  necessarily to  free women from the  weight  of  child
rearing, but rather to introduce a three-fold status of citizens-workers-mothers. The result of
this policy making, which materialized, for example, in extensive periods of maternal leaves
(i.e. three years in Hungary and in the German Democratic Republic), did  not mean, however,
a full transition from “maternalism2” to a “gender-neutral” society. Rather, it corresponded to
the addition of further tasks given to women.
2 The maternalist family logic in force in the immediate aftermath of World War II was based on the assumption
that women had to be the only care-givers. Nowadays, by contrast, a “dualization” of responsibilities can be
witnessed. On the transition from  “maternalism” to an “employment for all society”, see Orloff (2006).
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Post-Communist Social Policy
Immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, CEECs engaged in a serious of drastic changes
to their pension systems. Reforms primarily aimed to: a) ensure financial sustainability of the
new system, extremely different from the one based on central planning; b) provide differenti-
ation of benefits so that the excessive equalization of life standards in force during commu-
nism could be interrupted; c) introduce market elements; and d) guarantee, at least, a basic in-
come for the citizens. Early retirement policies were widely used, especially in the first years
of transition, with the aim to reduce the pressure on the labour market. This strategy revealed
itself as extremely expensive in times of raising unemployment and more recent reforms now
aim at reducing the access to these policies. 
A brief overview of Central  and Eastern European pension systems shows that almost  all
countries have now completed the introduction of the so-called three pillar scheme, as recom-
mended by the World Bank in the well-known publication Averting the Old Age Crisis (World
Bank 1994). The first pillar is state managed, mandatory and based on pay-as-you-go. The
second pillar is privately managed and compulsory funded. The third complementary pillar is
a voluntary pension tier. On the basis of the Chilean experience, Hungary and Poland have
been the first countries in Eastern Europe to introduce such a scheme, but now also Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovak Republic have followed this reform path.
Only in Czech Republic and Slovenia has the full implementation of the three pillar scheme
been temporarily blocked due to possible transition costs, but the most recent political debate
draws attention to the necessity of increasing the role of the recently established private tiers,
currently based on a voluntary, rather than on a compulsory affiliation3 (see Table 1). 
3 On pension reforms in Eastern Europe, see Orenstein (2005, 2008), Cerami (2006a, ch. 3), MISSOC (2007).
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Table 1 Pension 2007
Three-Pillar
Scheme Type Retirement Age
Minimum
Contribution
Years
Fourth
Pillar
Bulgaria √ earnings-related       63 men59 women 15 √
Czech Rep. I and III Pillar
earnings-related 
+ 
flate-rate
      61.8 men
60 women 15
√
Estonia √
earnings-related 
+ 
flate-rate
      63 men
  60 women 15
√
Hungary √ earnings-related       62 men61 women 15 √
Latvia √ earnings-related NDC
      62.5 men
61 women 10
√
Lithuania √ earnings-related       62.5 men60 women 15 √
Poland √ earnings-relatedNDC
65 men
60 women 20
√
Romania √ earnings-related 63 men58 women 15 √
Slovakia √ earnings-related 62 men62 women 10 √
Slovenia I and III Pillar earnings-related 63 men61 women 15
√
Source: MISSOC 2007
The Soviet-style health care system was under great pressure and in urgent need of reforms.
Health care expenditures were below the OECD average, poor quality of health care services
and high morbidity rates were the norm, and the low wages of medical personnel did not help
to improve the performance of this system (see WHO Hit Profiles). As a consequence, post-
1989 reforms aimed at finding an immediate and possibly painless response to these issues.
The best  way of  dealing with  the  chronic  lack  of  funds  was obviously seen  through the
introduction  of  health  insurance,  which,  in  the  mind  of  policy-makers,  would  have
immediately  increased  the  funds  available,  financing  it  with  the  money of  workers  and
therefore not aggravating the state budget. This reform path was also intended to conduct a
shift (or rather an increase) of responsibilities from the state to the individual. Other important
characteristics of reforms were the possibility to freely choose the doctors and the hospitals,
the decentralization in the management of health care from central to local authorities and the
introduction of a competitive and market-oriented system of medicines, of medical equipment
and of insurances. Medical services are now provided upon the payment of health insurance
contributions in Bulgaria, Czech Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary, Lithuania,  Poland, Romania,
Slovak  Republic  and  Slovenia4,  but  this  does  not  mean  that  the  state  has  completely
abandoned its duties to ensure minimum coverage for its citizens. All Central and Eastern
4 Please note that health care in Latvia is tax-financed.
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European constitutions established after 1989 reaffirm the right to equal access to health care
and non protected citizens must be insured by the state5 (see Table 2).
Table 2 Health Care 2007
Health
Insurance Year State Involvement
Bulgaria √ 1998/2004 Medium
Czech Rep. √ 1991/1997 Strong
Estonia √ 2002 Strong
Hungary √ 1997 Strong
Latvia Tax-financed 1997 Strong
Lithuania √ 1996 Strong
Poland √ 1997/2004 Low
Romania √ 1998/2006 Medium
Slovakia √ 2004 Strong(medium in the future)
Slovenia √ 2002/2005 Strong
Source: MISSOC 2007
Regrettably, the shift from a central planned economy to a market economy coincided with the
collapse of many state-owned enterprises and the dismissals of several million workers. As a
result of raising demands caused by the growing number of unemployed, Central and Eastern
European policy-makers put in  place a general  system of unemployment insurance, which
only partially succeeded to limit the negative consequences of the economic transition. In all
countries in this study the favorite option was the implementation of a German-style unem-
ployment insurance consisting, for the most part, of: a) unemployment benefits; b) unemploy-
ment assistance; and c) social assistance. Despite this similar reform path, the systems of pro-
tection against unemployment in the region show some differences in the entitlement criteria
of benefits, probably due to the fact that the initial economic conditions and the consequent
demands necessary to combat unemployment substantially differed.  Minimum requirements
for access to unemployment benefits (2007) range from 200 days of employment in the previ-
ous 4 years in Hungary to three years over the last four years in the Slovak Republic. The dur-
ation of benefits also differ from country to country. In the Czech and Slovak Republic, it can-
not be longer than 6 months, while in Slovenia unemployment benefits can last up to a max-
imum of twenty four months. In Poland, the duration also depends on the level of regional de-
velopment. In underdeveloped regions, it can be up to 18 months, while in districts with un-
employment rates below the national average it is granted for no longer than 6 months. As far
as the amount of benefits is concerned, the criteria for the calculation are usually earnings-re-
lated in Bulgaria,  the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia,
5 On health care reforms in Eastern Europe, see also WHO Hit Profiles, Cerami (2006a, ch. 4), MISSOC (2007).
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while a strong flat-rate component still exists in Poland6 and Romania (see Table 3). Despite
this diversity of arrangements, some common trends in the most recent reforms are identifi-
able. These include a reduction of entitlement criteria and the diminution in the level as well
as in the duration of benefits7. 
Table 3 Protection against Unemployment 2007
Unemployment
Insurance Qualifying Period
Maximum Duration of
Benefits Amount of Benefits
Bulgaria
√
earnings-related
9 months over the
last 15 months 4-12 months
60 % of previous
earnings
Czech Rep.
√
earnings-related
12 months over
previous 3 years 6 months
50% of reference
earnings (3 months).
Then 45% 
Estonia
√
earnings-related
12 months over
previous 36 months 9 months
50% of reference
earning. Then 40% 
Hungary
√
earnings-related
200 days over
previous 4 years 9 months
60-65% of previous
earnings
Latvia
√
earnings-related
9 months in the last
12 months 9 months
50-65% of previous
earnings
Lithuania
√
earnings-related
18 months over
previous 3 years 6-9 months
Fixed + Variable
Component
(national currency)
Poland
√
flate rate benefit (new
law 2004)
365 days over
previous 18 months
6  months  areas
unemployment  less  than
125% national average;
12 months areas with
unemployment of at least
125%;
 18 months areas where
unemployment is more
than twice the national
average
Unemployment
Allowance
(national currency)
Romania
√
strong flate rate
component
12 months over
previous 24 months 12 months
Unemployment
Indemnity (flate rate)
+ earning related
component
Slovakia
√
earnings-related
3 years over
previous 4 years 6 months
50% assessment
base
Slovenia
√
earnings-related
12 months over
previous 18 months 3-24 months
70% (3 months).
Then 60%
Source: MISSOC 2007
As mentioned previously, CEECs inherited an extensive system of family policies, both in
terms of coverage but also in terms of benefits  granted. In almost  all  countries numerous
provisions are still available for citizens, which often cover children if not “from the cradle to
the grave”, then at least to the completion of secondary school or university (see Table 4).
Current trends of reforms do not seem to be characterized by a drastic shift in objectives.
Central and Eastern European governments still  tend to encourage young mothers to  have
more than one child, in many cases openly pursuing a pro-natalist policy-making as they did
during communism. In CEE, young women have access to long maternal leaves (longer than
6 Please note that the 2004 legislation in Poland has introduced a flate-rate benefit. 
7 On protection against unemployment in CEE, see Cazes and Nesporova (2003), Vaughan-Whitehead (2005),
Cerami (2006a, ch. 5), MISSOC (2007).
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in Western Europe), tax exemptions and, in some countries, also to special credits for buying
a house (e.g. Hungary) or to set up a family (e.g. in the Baltic States). The situation is different
in less economic performing countries, such as in Bulgaria and in Romania, where women are
still seriously disadvantaged in comparison to men. However, as Orloff (2006) has recently
argued  for  Western  Europe,  the  general  trend  seems  to  be  that  of  a  slow  shift  from  a
“maternalist”  family  logic  in  force  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of  World  War  II  to  an
“employment  for  all”  family  logic,  which  recognizes  the  dual  breadwinner  role  in  child
rearing. This is not to say, however, that governments have succeeded to fully ensure “gender
neutrality”. Most of the differences between men and women still persist in the labour market.
These include significant gender wage gaps, access to higher and better positions for men, the
persistence of labour segregation for women, lack of recognition between paid and unpaid
work,  and  so  on  (Fultz  et  al.  2003; Schnepf  2004; Orloff  2006).  What  is  important  to
remember here is that this orientation towards a “gender neutral” society started in Eastern
Europe before than Western Europe, but also well before the fall of the Berlin Wall8. 
Table 4 Family Policies 2007
Maternity
Leave Child Benefit Child Raising Allowances
Bulgaria 315 days Up to 20 years Up to 2 years and 6 months
Czech Rep. 196 days Up to 26 years Up to 4 years
Estonia 140 days Up to 19 years Up to 3 years
Hungary 168 days Up to 23 years Up to 3 years
Latvia 112 days Up to 20 years Up to 1-2 years
Lithuania 126 days Up to 24 years Up to 3 years
Poland 112 days Up to 24 years Up to 2-3 years
Romania 126 days Up to 18 years Up to 1 year
Slovakia 196 days Up to 15 years Up to 3 years
Slovenia 105 days Up to 26 years Up to 260 days
Source: MISSOC 2007
Social Assistance Regimes in Transition
Since the command economy regulated all prices of domestic goods in order to provide a
minimum subsistence level to its citizens, state-socialist policy-makers did not give social
assistance provisions the importance they deserved (Milanovic 1995). This does not mean
that social assistance schemes were not necessary during communism. They were necessary,
especially for the less integrated groups of the society, such as the Roma, and for people who
were  for  some  reason  unable  to  work  (for  example,  pensioners  and  people  affected  by
disability or chronic illnesses). As Milanovic (1995) has emphasized, the extreme importance
that  the  state-socialist  society gave to  work-performance as a mean of freedom from the
capitalist oppression resulted in an implicit social stigma for all those citizens that in some
8 On family polices in CEE, see Pascal and Kwak (2005), Cerami (2006a, ch. 6), MISSOC (2007).
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way did not or could not conform to the idea of the perfect communist worker. Subsequently,
merits  acquired  through a  workaholic  attitude  had  to  be  distinguished  from the  implicit
reactionary threat of non-workers. The “good communist workers” often received medals as a
symbol  of  their  excellent  work-performance,  while  the  “bad  communist  workers”  were
usually  the  ones  who  lived  at  the  expense  of  society.  It  goes  unsaid  that  providing  a
comprehensive system of social  assistance provisions to these people was something that
contradicted the communist political aims (Milanovic 1995). 
In more practical terms, social assistance during communism consisted of a series of social
services  provided  by  local  offices  to  people  without  stable  jobs,  vagabonds  and  the
handicapped. These services could take the form of in-kind benefits (such as food, housing
and so on) and/or income supplement in order to achieve a minimum level of consumption.
Unfortunately, since economic planners set these minima on the basis of a supposedly perfect
system, the benefits received only rarely corresponded to real needs and poverty continued to
exist in state-socialist societies (Milanovic 1995).
With the fall of the communist command economy, new instruments to combat poverty were
necessary. Regulation of prices could no longer be used to maintain the artificially low costs
of foods. Ex-state owned enterprises now needed to cope with the concurrence of Western
industries and could no longer be the source of social security. In brief, rationalization of
production rather than full-employment were the new economic keywords. In order to cope
with raising unemployment and inflation, most Central and Eastern European governments
introduced generous social assistance schemes. Particularly during the first period of reforms,
access to these benefits was relatively easy and used more as a means of compensation for the
loss of job, brought about by the involuntary dissolution of the communist social contract.
Strict means-testing was rarely applied, primarily because of feasibility problems. 
One of the key features of Central  and Eastern European social  assistance schemes is  the
establishment  of  a  Minimum,  or  Guaranteed,   Income Level  as  a  poverty threshold.  All
households and citizens that find themselves below the poverty line established by law have
the right to social assistance benefits.  These provisions can take the form of cash, in-kind
benefits  or  services.  The  amount  is  calculated  as  the  difference  between  the  official
subsistence  level  and  the  family or  individual  disposable  income.  With  the  exception  of
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Hungary, which has no statutory Guaranteed Minimum Income (although numerous similar
provisions exist for certain groups) and, to some extent Poland, the Minimum Subsistence
Level strictly regulates the access to social assistance provisions in Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The leading principle of these
schemes is clearly that of ensuring basic income to all citizens, even tough this objective is
achieved through a unified amount in Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia
and Slovenia, while a differential  amount exists  in Bulgaria and Lithuania, thus aiming at
preserving  some  form  of  income  differentiation  even  at  the  lowest  level.  In  Poland,  by
contrast, the social and citizenship rights of poor persons are drastically limited by the strong
discretionary character for accessing the benefits granted by the social service workers. As far
as the duration of benefits is concerned, this usually takes place for an unlimited period, even
though restrictions exist in Lithuania (benefits cannot be granted for more than 9 months in a
year),  in  Slovakia (benefits  cannot  be granted for more than 24 months)  and in  Slovenia
(benefits can be granted for 3 up to 6 months). Means-testing is the key entitlement factor in
all countries under scrutiny and this must usually be coupled to real efforts of the unemployed
in actively seeking a job. In this context, it is clear that the continuous requests of the EU and
other international organizations (notably the World Bank and the OECD) for “activation”
have not remained unheard by the new Member States. Finally, the amount of benefits is set at
the central government level in all countries with the sole exclusion of Latvia. This decision
that aims at equalizing standards among the citizens has, however, also its shortcomings, since
it can produce discrepancies between the amount necessary in different regions. As it is well
known, CEECs are, in fact, characterized by huge regional differences expressed in terms of
economic development but also in terms of welfare services9 (see Table 5).
9 On social assistance in CEE, see Cerami (2006a, ch. 7), MISSOC (2007).
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Table 5 Social Assistance 2007
Guaranteed
Minimum
Income
Principle Period Means-
Tested
Determination
of Amount
Bulgaria √ 2005
Ensure basic
income. Differential
amount
Unlimited Yes CentralGovernment
Czech Rep.
√ 1991/2006 Ensure basic
income Unlimited Yes
Central
Government
Estonia √ 1995 Ensure basicincome Unlimited Yes
Central
Government
Hungary
No Guaranteed
Income.
(other
provisions
available)
other provisions
available NA NA NA
Latvia √ 2002 Ensure basicincome Unlimited Yes
Central
Government/
Local
Municipalities
Lithuania √ 1990/2006
Ensure basic
income. Differential
amount
No more 9
months/year Yes
Central
Government
Poland √ 2004
Ensure basic
income.
Discretionary
entitlement
Permanent but
discretionary Yes
Central
Government
Romania √ 2001 Ensure basicincome Unlimited Yes
Central
Government
Slovakia √ 2003 Ensure basicincome 24 months Yes
Central
Government
Slovenia √ 2004 Ensure basicincome 3 to 6 months Yes
Central
Government
Source: MISSOC 2007
Challenges of Post-Communist Social Policy
Which are the most urgent reform challenges that the CEECs are called to deal with? Most of
them are similar to the challenges that other Western European welfare states are facing (such
as ageing population, ensuring financial balance of the system, improving work conditions
and safety at work, promoting gender equality, etc.), and that have led social policy scholars to
draw attention to the necessity to “recast” (Ferrera and Rhodes 2000), to “recalibrate” (Pierson
2001) or to “defrost” (Palier 2000) current welfare institutions. Other challenges, by contrast,
seem to be particularly urgent for Central and Eastern Europe and are mainly focused on the
sustainability of the newly established welfare arrangement. These include the necessity to
ensure: a) coverage for the citizens; b) sufficient income; c) long-term sustainability of health,
pension and unemployment insurance under conditions  of great financial  pressure;  and d)
certainty for those citizens who have invested or will invest in private funds. 
Ensuring coverage for the population (and not only for workers) is certainly one of the most
pressing problems.  The collapse of  the command economy with its  centralized  system of
resource allocation has, in fact, drastically altered the distributive character of the countries in
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transition, with a growing number of citizens now involuntarily catapulted out of the labour
market. The introduction of Bismarck-style welfare institutions (Cerami 2006a, 2008), which
link the access to benefits to the contribution record of the insured, has inevitably implied the
exclusion of numerous citizens, who now find themselves almost unprotected, if unemployed,
or, only partially protected, in case of atypical,  informal or part-time workers.  These new
professional  categories  have  all  drastically increased  in  recent  years  (Vaughan-Whitehead
2005). Ensuring coverage is not only limited to the pension and health care sector, but also
includes unemployment insurance and, more in general, those policies aimed at preventing
social exclusion, such as social assistance provisions. Strict means-testing with the subsequent
tightening  of  eligibility  criteria,  as  often  suggested  by  the  most  influential  financial
institutions,  notably the  OECD and  World  Bank,  has,  in  fact,  implied  not  only a  drastic
reduction in eligible citizens, but also an increase in social stigma for those who succeeded to
receive the benefits.
Providing sufficient income for citizens is, probably, the second most important challenge.
The  monetarization  and  individualization  of  responsibilities  and  risks has  resulted  in  a
dramatic increase in income inequality with a substantial reduction of earning possibilities for
a large part of the population. From one of the lowest rates of income inequality in Europe
(income inequality during communism was well below the Western average, see Milanovic
1995), CEECs are now coming close or even overcoming (such as in the case of the Baltic
countries, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) the EU 15 average10 (see Figure 1).
10 In Figure 1, income inequality is defined by “the ratio of total income received by the 20 % of the population
with the highest income (top quintile) to that received by the 20 % of the population with the lowest income
(lowest quintile). Income must be understood as equivalized disposable income”. Definition by Eurostat 2008.
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Fig. 1 Inequality of Income Distribution (2006)
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Poverty  in  the  region  has  also  dramatically  increased,  as  many  studies  have  repeatedly
emphasized (Ferge et al. 2002; Stanovnik and Stropnik 2002; Szelényi 2002; Zhelyazkova et
al.  2002; Orenstein  et al.  2003; Cerami 2003, 2006).  Figure 2 provides a brief overview of
poverty rates in 2006 divided by gender and shows how, with the sole exception of Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia, poverty rates tend be higher for women than for men. Here, it is perhaps
interesting to note how the situation for women in the new Member States is now close to the
one present in the old Member States, where the traditional family pattern based on the male-
breadwinner model (see Lewis 1992) has contributed, during the decades, to the feminization
of poverty11. Nevertheless, women are not the only vulnerable group of transition, with the
young, elderly, households with children (particularly single households), workers of ex state-
owned enterprises and the Roma community also being extremely disadvantaged  (Szelényi
2002; Orenstein et al. 2003; UNECE 2004). 
11 In Figure 2, the poverty rate is defined by “the share of persons with an equivalized disposable income below
the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalized disposable income (after
social  transfers)  the lowest income (lowest quintile).  Income must be understood  as equivalized disposable
income”. Definition by Eurostat 2008.
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Fig. 2 People at Risk of Poverty (2006), by Gender
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Figure 3 provides a simple, but clear picture of the impact of social transfers in the region. As
it can be seen, social transfers substantially reduced poverty in almost all countries. Only in
Bulgaria, Latvia, and Romania the poverty reduction rate12 has been lower than 30 per cent,
but these are also the most problematic countries in terms of economic recovery, also having
recently opted for more market oriented welfare institutions. In short, it can be affirmed that
welfare institutions, by reducing the number of poor people, have been vital democratizing
forces, helping to ensure stability for the democratic institutions recently established (Cerami
2003, 2006a). 
Fig. 3 People at Risk of Poverty (2006)
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12 The poverty reduction rate is calculated as the difference between the poverty rate before and after social
transfers. 
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The  third,  most  pressing  issue,  concerns  the  long-term  sustainability  of  the  recently
established  health,  pension  and  unemployment  insurance  under  conditions  of  extreme
financial pressure. The employment ratio in the ten countries studied has drastically decreased
since the first years of transition from an average of 79 per cent in 1990 to 65 per cent in 2004
(see Table 6). This has resulted in a serious reduction of the social security receipts, with the
necessity of an increase either in social insurance contributions for the workers remained in
activity or an increase in expenses for the state budget now called to cover the deficit of the
newly established social insurance funds. The growing number of pensioners, of unemployed,
and  of  sick  people  (due  to  the  deterioration  of  life  quality  following  the  austerities  of
transition) has also helped to aggravate a situation already disastrous. 
Table 6 Employment Ratio*
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Bulgaria 82 78 68 63 63 57 58 60 60 59 56 55 55 57 57 59
Czech Rep. 87 86 77 75 76 76 76 75 74 73 71 71 71 71 71 70
Estonia 88 87 86 82 78 77 73 73 73 72 69 69 69 70 71 71
Hungary 83 83 80 71 64 58 57 57 57 57 59 60 60 60 61 61
Latvia - - - - - - - 64 67 67 67 65 67 69 70 70
Lithuania 84 82 84 82 80 75 74 74 73 69 68 66 63 66 67 67
Poland 75 71 67 65 63 62 62 63 63 63 60 59 58 55 54 55
Romania 77 77 77 75 72 78 79 78 78 77 76 76 75 66 66 65
Slovakia 80 77 67 67 65 64 64 66 65 64 61 60 60 60 61 60
Slovenia 75 72 66 63 67 67 69 69 70 71 69 69 71 71 69 73
Average 81 79 75 72 70 68 68 68 68 67 66 65 65 65 65 65
Source: TransMonee Database 2006
* Annual average number of employed as per cent of population aged 15-59
Fourth,  the  uncertainty following the  introduction  of  private  schemes  in  times  of  market
instability should not be forgotten. The introduction of compulsory and voluntary private tiers
in the three pillar scheme reform (the second and third pillar) raises serious concerns not only
with regard to the so-called double-payment (Bonoli 2000; Myles and Pierson 2001) necessary
for financing the transition from a PAYG to a fully funded system (current workers would in
fact be called to pay twice: once to finance current pensioners under the PAYG scheme and
once  for  their  own  individual  accounts),  but  it  also  raises  important  questions  on  the
trustworthiness of the private pension funds allowed to operate in the market. The temptation
of  private  pension  funds  to  declare  bankruptcy or  insolvency,  in  absence  of  an  effective
legislation, should market conditions create difficulties to the financial  profitability of the
company, should not be underestimated. In this case, the state will be called to either cover the
expenses  of  pension  funds  or  directly  insuring  the  citizens  who  have  seen  their  savings
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disappear. It is  also important to note that  it  is often impossible to predict the actual end
pension that retiring workers will receive. A study carried out by the ILO (2000) has, in fact,
expressed serious doubts on pension fund managers’ ability to predict the future amount of
pensions for their  clients due to the volatility and the unpredictability of markets.  Similar
considerations apply for the newly established health funds, which in numerous cases have
been abolished soon after their introduction due to a lack of funds necessary to ensure even
minimum services. Last but not least, close to the raising costs associated with the increase in
administration and management costs caused by the decentralization of responsibilities from
central  to  local  governments  (but  also  from  public  to  private  funds),  it  has  also  to  be
questioned whether private insurance companies should be allowed to carry out a preventive
screening in order to see which potential  clients are affected by chronic illnesses (such as
diabetes), which would inevitably imply more costs  for the health insurance company. 
To conclude, just to quote few examples of the dissatisfaction of Eastern citizens with current
reforms, in 2003, with the sole exclusion of the Czech Republic and Slovenia, the satisfaction
with the quality of the health care system13 was dramatically below the EU 15 average (Figure
4), while also the quality of social services14 was evaluated more negatively in the East than in
the West (Figure 5).
Fig. 4 Satisfaction with Health Care System (2003)
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13 Question: “Percentage of individuals who are very or fairly satisfied with their national health system”.
14 Quality of social services: “mean value on a scale of 1 'very poor quality' to 10 'very high quality' of the
national public social services.
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Fig. 5 Quality of Social Services (2003)
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Explaining Post-Communist Adaptation 
Unquestionably, one of the key questions  that  needs to be addressed in  order to  improve
understanding of the post-communist transition is the identification of the main mechanisms
responsible for institutional change (Cerami and Ettrich forchcoming). In our specific case, a
particular attention must be given to the factors that have influenced the social policy reform
process,  facilitating the implementation  of specific  welfare  institutions  at  the  expenses  of
others. Why has, for example, a social insurance model been introduced instead of a system
financed by taxes? Why have entitlement criteria been granted on the basis of the professional
status instead of on the basis of citizenship? In short, how do we explain the introduction of
new post-communist welfare institutions?
The most common approach to welfare state change in Central and Eastern Europe, deeply
rooted  in  the  tradition  of  modernization  theory  (see  Zapf  1998),  has  looked  at  the
transformation from a communist to a post-communist welfare state as a mere shift from a de-
differentiated and de-modernized welfare system to a differentiated and modernized one. As
in many other areas, social policies have been understood as a result of a simple transfer from
the West to the East, due to the innate superiority of the Western model. The only effort made
by the recipient  countries  was in accepting this  policy transfer  with the associated policy
prescriptions. This would have inevitably led to a fast modernization of their obsolete system
of social security (see, for instance, continuous references in OECD and World Bank reports
to introduce a welfare state mirrored on the Western model). 
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Needless to say, this approach is clearly simplistic,  since it does not take into account the
historical background of the countries in which specific policy options had to be implemented.
Why should, in fact, be a model good for the West also be good for the East? A substantially
different  understanding of  welfare  state  change is  an approach based on path-dependency
theory and on neo-institutionalism. Here, welfare state change is understood in terms of an
incremental transformation in which historical, social, political and institutional legacies play
a  crucial  role  hindering a  full  and  aseptic  policy transfer.  In a  nutshell,  according to  the
supporters of this approach, post-communist countries have not built the new society out of
the ruins of communism, but rather with the ruins of communism (Stark 1992; Stark and
Bruszt 1998; Eyal et al. 2003). 
With regard to the transformation of the welfare state, social policy characteristics in place in
the pre-communist  (Bismarck-style social  insurance)  and communist  period (universalism,
corporatism and egalitarianism) have permeated the post-communist reform process, with its
new consensus on market-based schemes (Cerami 2006a). A brief overview of pre-communist
Central and Eastern European pension and health care systems shows that all countries had
already established some form of Bismarck-style pension and health insurance, which linked
the access to benefits to professional status. In the years 1906 to 1928, the numerous funded
pension and health  care schemes established were based on a  corporatist  vision  of social
solidarity, primarily aiming to secure occupational standards. At the end of World War II, the
attempt of the Soviet Union to dismantle these social security systems and to include them in
the Soviet  welfare regime was only partially successful.  Most of the peculiarities in force
during the first stage of Bismarck reforms survived to the drastic social policy re-organization.
In almost all these countries, the universal and egalitarian principles spread by the communist
regime were, in fact, coupled to a corporatist vision of social solidarity.
As a consequence of on-going evolutionary processes, the contemporary Central and Eastern
European welfare  regime seems to be the result  of  an ambiguous policy mix  of different
elements.  The three-pillar scheme of pension insurance has turned into a four-pillar model,
where a strong link to social assistance provisions ensures coverage for those citizens whose
income under the above scheme would not be sufficient (see also Wagener 2002). Market-
based health insurance, characterized by a strong link between contributions paid and services
received,  has  been introduced,  but  coupled,  in  all  countries,  with  the  universal  principles
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guaranteed  by the  state,  which  is  still  responsible  to  cover  numerous  uninsured  citizens.
Finally,  unemployment,  social  assistance  and family benefits,  introduced  with  the  aim to
reduce temporary poverty, have changed their nature and scope from residual safety nets into
active democratization forces. A mix of market-orientation, targeting and universality has then
become the new distinctive attribute of these areas.  If analyzed in their global context, the
abovementioned characteristics are evidence for a significant degree of cohesion among these
welfare states in transition and may allow for the emergence of a new and unique welfare
regime (Cerami  2006a),  in  which different  worlds  of  welfare coexist  and are recombined
together. To use a definition recently provided by Lamping and Rϋb (2004) for Germany,  the
welfare  regime in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  can,  therefore,  be  described  in  terms  of  a
“recombinant welfare state15”, where Bismarck features remain preponderant (Cerami 2008).
What is important to remember here is that, even though Bismarck features remain the key
characteristics of the new welfare arrangement (the  mode of access to social  protection is
based on work/contribution, social  benefits  are primarily in  cash and earnings-related,  the
financing mechanism is based on social contribution and the administrative structures involve
social  partners in  the management of the social  insurance funds), the new welfare regime
displays peculiar attributes with regard to the functions and roles played by the schemes of
social assistance. Indeed, despite the fact that not all social assistance provisions existent in
these countries are the same (Hungary has, for example, no statutory Guaranteed Minimum
Income), they all tend to be more extensive in coverage and scope than the ones present in
many other  European  Member  States,  most  notably Mediterranean,  Continental  and  even
Scandinavian countries. Furthermore, if a comparison with the classical Esping-Andersen’s
(1990) typology is  conducted,  then it  can be seen how the Central  and Eastern European
welfare  regime  shows  different normative/ideational  elements.  While  the  main  aim  and
emphasis of the Conservative welfare regime remains on security (that is providing job and
income security for male workers), of the “liberal” world is poverty alleviation and equality
the main feature of the Nordic welfare regime (see Palier forthcoming), in the Central and
Eastern European case, a combination of all three normative/ideational elements coupled with
aspirations for democratic consolidation is the main characteristic.
 
15 For Lamping and Rϋb (2004), the German welfare state is in transition from the classical Bismarckian type to
an “uncertain something else” that the authors cautiously call a “conservative universalism”. Please note that the
term  recombinant property has first been used by Stark (1996) and Stark and Bruszt (1998) to describe the
evolution of Central and Eastern European markets.  For the term recombinant governance, see Crouch (2005).
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Important to remember here is also the transformation that contemporary European societies
are  undergoing.  This  is  involving  a  process  of  functional,  distributive,  normative and
institutional  recalibration16 (Hemerijck  2006;  Ferrera  at  al.  forthcoming)  of  the  welfare
architecture introduced during the trente glorieuses of the welfare state (the period from the
1950s to 1970s). Indeed, not only an institutional recalibration is taking place in these welfare
states in transition (that is to say a recalibration of the old institutions in order to meet the new
emerging needs of the post-communist  environment), but also a  recalibration of the main
welfare functions (functional recalibration), distributive aspects (distributive recalibration)
and  basic  norms  (normative  recalibration)  (see  also  Hemerijck  2006;  Ferrera  et  al.
forthcoming). In the Central and Eastern European case, this new wave of recalibration will
require a new phase of social  modernization,  which should  result  in  an expansion of the
political, economic and social rights granted so far (at least, if the objectives of the  Lisbon
Strategy want fully to be met). In this context, social assistance provisions remain key players
in ensuring that no one falls into extreme poverty and, in order to be adequately reformed,
should change their inner social policy logics from “basic safety nets” to real “empowering
social  policy instruments”. The establishment of a “basic income for all citizens” (whether
means-tested  or  not),  as  now  proposed  by  an  always  larger  number  of  scholars  (for  a
discussion on this topic,  see Schmitter  2000; Cerami 2006b; Opielka 2008) could,  in  this
context, represent an important tool to meet the economic and social objectives as expressed
by the Lisbon Strategy.  
Conclusions
Voluntarily or  not,  Central  and  Eastern  European social  assistance schemes  became key
players  in  the  process  of  transformation  from  a  central  planned  economy  to  a  market
economy, recombining the principles  based on solidarity, in  place during the communist
period, with the new emergent needs caused by the deterioration of the economic situation. If
during communism, state responsibility was the leading moral principle put in place in order
to ensure a basic subsistence level to all communist citizens, as well as promoting the leading
communist  ideology,  then  this  conception  has  been  re-implemented  in  the  new  post-
communist environment. The existence of social assistance provisions established during the
16 The concepts of functional, distributive, normative and institutional recalibration have first been introduced
by Ferrera et al. (2000) to describe the changes that contemporary welfare systems are facing. According to the
authors, not only an institutional recalibration is taking place in western welfare states, but also a recalibration
of the main welfare functions, distributive aspects and basic norms (see also Hemerijck 2006; Ferrera et al.
forthcoming).
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first  years of transition has, in  fact,  played a dual role.  On the one hand, it  has fostered
political support for economic reforms; whilst on the other, it has facilitated the stabilization
of transition and the consolidation of democratic institutions. Interestingly, social assistance
provisions are not a new introduction of reforms, but are part of the communist heritage.
Social minimum lines already existed in the central planned economy as “socially desirable”
levels of consumption. These minima now represent the most notable legacy of the past, but
are also important elements of innovation and modernization in the present. What is needed,
at  this  point,   is a  new empowering politics of  the welfare state (see Cerami and Ettrich
forthcoming) able to provide citizens with new chances.
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